Insightview.eu has invited Joergen Delman, professor emeritus, PhD, China Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, to write about the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The pdf-version of this article is available here.   
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‌‌The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ended on 22 October. During a brief week, the almost 2300 delegates listened to long reports and discussed them in their constituency groups. The proceedings are largely secret, but the media routinely hyped the Congress and its proceedings with small snippets that largely focused on praising Xi Jinping. The minutely planned and splendidly staged spectacle made it extremely clear that two overarching themes dominated the Congress: Xi Jinping’s indispensable key role and his control over the CPC on the one hand, and the need for political, social and economic continuity on the other.

‌The moment of suspense immediately after every Communist Party Congress is when the new Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Communist Party’s absolute top leadership, takes the stage at a press gathering. This time, it was on Sunday 23 October. The new leadership that Xi presented comprises only men who have been wise to bet on the right horse, men Xi trusts, but also men with good and appropriate careers. Xi had evidently been able to secure his third term as General Secretary without conceding to aspirations for top positions by less aligned competitors.

‌Therefore, it is likely that the incident during the final day of the Congress when Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was spectacularly, unprecedentedly, and clearly unwillingly escorted out of the congress hall in front of Xi, the outgoing leadership, the remainder of the 2,300 delegates, and several hundred million TV viewers could be interpreted in more than one way. The official Xinhua News reported on Twitter, which is forbidden in China, that Hu Jintao insisted on attending the closing session of the Party's 20th National Congress despite bad health and that he was now feeling better. But the incident could also be seen as a last protest from the ailing head of a dead faction who got upset when he realised, finally, that it was game-over. There has been no explanation of the incident on the national Chinese media networks, and we must wait and see if there are further repercussions for Hu’s trustees to conclude on this.
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‌‌Does age, education, and gender matter?

‌The informal age rules guiding retirement of Chinese leaders that observers of Chinese politics often discuss in connection with power transitions are not valid anymore, and they have always been loose at any rate. Xi is already beyond the unofficial retirement age. The same is the case with foreign minister Wang Yi, born in 1953. Being 69, he was supposed to retire, but instead he became a member of the politburo and will probably take charge of China’s foreign policy.

‌Yet, somehow age still matters. The members of the Standing Committee are all between 60 and 69 which seems to be the optimal age bracket for members of the top leadership.

‌Gender also matters in the sense that for the first time in 25 years, there are no women on the Politburo. Over the past decades, there has always been a seat for a woman. This seat has been removed this time. Furthermore, only 27 % of Congress delegates were female and only 5.4 % of the members of the new Central Committee of 205 were women. This testifies to ossification of China’s leadership around paternalistic and male-loyalistic structures and ties and is a notable defeat to China’s organized women and Chinese feminism which has suffered badly under Xi Jinping. MeToo cases are also difficult to get through with. Zhang Gaoli, former vice-premier, attended the Congress, although he was publicly accused of sexual assault by tennis star Peng Shuai last year. Apparently, the case has had no consequences for him.
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When facing a gloomy future, continuity counts

‌In his comprehensive report to the Congress Xi focused more on security issues, ideology and control with the CPC than on the economy. In the economic sections, he stressed the need to put greater emphasis on progress in core technologies and more equal distribution of growth. The first point addresses the increasingly sharp competition with the US for leadership in the technologies of the future while the second focuses on preventing income inequality to get out of hand by keeping “the means of accumulating wealth well-regulated”. This may be read as a warning about an imminent regulatory storm targeted at the private sector. Furthermore, Xi also reiterated his idea about “common prosperity for all”. This entails that the Party will promote social fairness and justice, bring prosperity to all, and prevent social polarization. It is uncertain as yet how this will be implemented in practice. On balance, Xi did not move into new political territory. Essentially, the need for continuity prevails and Xi Jinping is presented as its indispensable guarantor.

Xi argued that China needs a secure national and international environment to continue its development. However, China is facing a “severe and complex international situation” and “external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time.” In contrast, like many times before, he reasoned that “strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent”, although the party can no longer rule out the possibility of a major war in the future.

This is most clear in relation to the Taiwan situation. Despite expectations to the contrary internationally, Xi’s approach remains consistent. China will focus on peaceful reunification but will never promise to renounce the use of force. This is, he noted, “directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking "Taiwan independence" and their separatist activities; it is by no means targeted at our Taiwan compatriots.” No timeline was given for the reunification with Taiwan.
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The Party Congress amended the CPC statute. This is not a legal document under Chinese law, since the CPC is an extra-legal organization. Rather, it regulates the activities of the Party and its relationship with the state. The revised version is meant to “uphold Xi Jinping’s core position” within the CPC. Even more, Xi’s main political ideas are now part and parcel of the Party Constitution. The focus is on ensuring higher-quality and more efficient, equitable, sustainable, and secure development of the economy. China’s new pattern of development, as explained by Xi, will focus on the domestic economy with a positive interplay between domestic and international economic flows (also called “double circulation”), pursuing high-quality development and giving full play to the role of talent as a primary development resource.
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What does it mean for us?

‌Competition and confrontation with the US will continue at the same level as now at least, and China will not open up for negotiations without attractive incentives. Xi did not mention China’s partnership with Russia, but Russia remains strategically indispensable to China and continues to be a key supplier of strategic resources.
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China’s economic growth is declining and a variety of international projections for this year are below the official annual growth target of 5.5 %. China’s National Bureau of Statistics decided to hold back economic growth figures that were due during the Party Congress, presumably because they would point to even poorer economic results than expected. Interestingly, Bloomberg reported on 22 October that apart from Premier Li Keqiang, economic ‘czar’ Liu He, central bank governor Yi Gang, and banking regulator Guo Shuqing, were not on the lists of full or alternate members of the new Central Committee. They are all known for being supportive of further economic opening up and reform. It is, therefore, likely that these men will have to go in March 2023 and that a new team will have to take charge of economic policy. Judging from Xi Jinping’s speeches, current economic policies will be maintained, but the reforms and opening up will be slower than during Xi Jinping’s second term. The idea of a certain measure of decoupling between China and the West has also taken roots in China.
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The Party is now Xi Jinping’s, and many Chinese do not seem to mind as long as they have jobs and stable incomes. Therefore, the economic growth and the unemployment rates will be important data points to watch, since Chinese citizens are bound to react if times go bad. Recent bank runs are proof of this. Xi Jinping also praised the zero-COVID policies, and he gave no indication of an imminent policy change. Eventually, this may undermine his legitimacy, as many Chinese citizens do not see the harsh policies as justified anymore.
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The increasing focus on ideology and Party affairs, on strengthening the involvement of the Party-state in all political, social and economic affairs may also stretch the Party’s resources. Furthermore, Xi is soon turning 70 and historical experience tells us that autocratic rulership may lose momentum as the ruler gets older. Therefore, we also need to follow how Xi’s chosen group of co-leaders handles China’s challenges during the next five years and whether loyalty to him will jeopardize their ability to deal with the mounting challenges.
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